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State v. Strickland: Evening the Odds in Rape Trials! North
Carolina Allows Expert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder to Disprove Victim Consent
Rape trials traditionally have stood alone among criminal proceedings as
examinations not of the defendant's actions, but of the victim's conduct, life-
style, and personal history.1 As a result, rape consistently has been the most
difficult violent crime to prove.2 Within the last twenty years, however, a con-
certed, albeit scattered, effort has begun to sweep away some of the archaic bar-
riers facing prosecutors at trial.3 Recently one of the largest of these barriers,
the difficulty of disproving consent,4 has come under fire as prosecutors seek to
use expert testimony concerning post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)5 to ex-
1. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 129-30
(1976) (pointing to the patriarchal nature of society and its ramifications on rape trials, which focus
on any possible "seduction, lying, mistaken identification, or 'wanton' behavior" by the victim). For
further examinations on the tendency of rape trials to investigate the victim, see S. BESSMER, THE
LAWS OF RAPE (1984); A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY (1979); T.
MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE (1979); C. WARNER, RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (1980); J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND
PUBLIC ATITrUDES (1981).
2. Sir Mathew Hale's often-quoted statement on rape prosecution symbolizes the enormous
barriers standing before rape victims:
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be
punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent.
1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1847).
Wigmore carried this fear of a false complaint and the resulting caution toward victims' claims
into modem times. "One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual
offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim." 3A J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 924a, at 736 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
3. Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates. The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1662-63 (1984).
4. Gager and Schurr described the uniqueness of the legal system's focus on consent in rape
trials, a focus not found in other criminal trials, and the difficulty this focus creates for victims:
The evolution of our legal process has thrust the consent issue into the center of the storm
about rape. The legal obverse of consent is resistance, resistance sufficient to prove lack of
consent. However, resistance, or nonconsent, is largely a subjective matter, and hundreds,
if not thousands, of rapists have been allowed to go free by police, juries, and judges who
have decided arbitrarily that the victim did not resist "enough."
N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 1, at 139-40.
5. Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involves the development of a series of characteristic
symptoms (physical and psychological) after an individual undergoes a particularly stressful situa-
tion. In the context of rape, psychologists describe a subcategory of PTSD as "the acute phase and
long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted rape." Burgess
& Hunter, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in THE RAPE VICTIM 121 (D. Nass ed. 1977). When rape is the
cause of this process commentators sometimes refer to the resulting PTSD syndrome as "rape
trauma syndrome" (RTS). Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 981, 982 (1974) [hereinafter Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome]; Burgess & Holm-
strom, Rape Trauma Syndrome and Post Traumatic Stress Response, in RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 49 (A. Burgess ed. 1985) [hereinafter Burgess & Holmstrom,
RT and PTSD]; Wilson, Smith & Johnson, A Comparative Analysis of PTSD Among Various Survi.
vor Groups, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY AND TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC
plain the victim's suffering and defeat the defense's contention that the victim
consented.
Four years after the issue first came before North Carolina courts, 6 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Strickland7 that expert testi-
mony on PTSD is relevant and admissible to disprove consent in rape trials." In
Strickland the trial court admitted, over the defendant's objections, expert testi-
mony that the victim suffered from PTSD.9 The appellate court held that such
testimony is relevant in rape cases and affirmed the ruling, but failed to address
directly whether PTSD evidence is universally admissible or remains limited to
cases similar to Strickland.10
This Note examines the Strickland decision in light of the controversial
history of PTSD expert testimony and the resulting split among the states re-
garding its admissibility. After exploring the arguments proffered against al-
lowing PTSD testimony, this Note concludes that both the relevance and
reliability of the technique justify the court's decision to allow such testimony in
limited situations. Finally, this Note discusses the failure of the Strickland
court to discuss the boundaries of PTSD testimony's admissibility, as well as the
implications of the appellate court's vague holding and the North Carolina
Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision.11
Strickland centered on the abduction of a woman as she left a mall in Ra-
leigh, North Carolina. The defendant, Wendell Wade Strickland, forced the vic-
STRESS DISORDER 142, 167 (C. Figley ed. 1985). For a discussion of the specific nature of PTSD
and RTS, see infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
Whether one refers to this syndrome as PTSD or RTS, the basic symptoms remain the same,
but within this general PTSD framework rape victims display certain peculiar behavior patterns,
such as a tendency to delay reporting the incident, memory failure immediately following the rape, a
desire to change daily living patterns, and a fear of men. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 281, 552
N.E.2d 131, 135, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 887 (1990) (noting the likelihood that RTS sufferers will exhibit
a heightened fear of men); Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra, at 983-84
(describing the desire of many rape victims to move in order to overcome their fear that the rapist
will find them again); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, Treating Fear and Anxiety in Rape Victims:
Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIMOLOGY 148, 151 (W. Par-
sonage ed. 1979) (immediately after a rape occurs many rape victims suffer from short-term memory
loss); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VIariM: A SYNTHE Is OP RESEARCH
FINDINGS, 188-90 (1979) (citing several studies indicating that a large percentage of women delay in
reporting the rape and noting that women who know their assailants wait even longer before filing a
police report).
6. State v. Stafford, 317 N.C. 568, 575, 346 S.E.2d 463, 468 (1986) (The court stated "we do
not deem it necessary to reach on this record the question whether in a proper case testimony about
rape trauma syndrome will be admissible in the courts of this state."), abrogation recognized by State
v. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. 642, 387 S.E.2d 62 (1990).
7. 96 N.C. App. 642, 387 S.E.2d 62, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
8. Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
9. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
10. Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
11. A recent appellate court case has clarified, somewhat, the boundaries of PTSD testimony in
sexual abuse cases. State v. Hall, 98 N.C. App. 1, 390 S.E.2d 169, disc. rev. allowed, 327 N.C. 486,
397 S.E.2d 228 (1990). In Hall the court upheld the trial court's admission of expert testimony to
help the jury determine if a rape had in fact occurred. Id. at 8, 390 S.E.2d at 172-73. This holding
answered one question that remained after Strickland, but failed to address a number of other con-
cerns stemming from the Strickland decision. See infra text accompanying notes 163-73.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Hall and one hopes it will estab-
lish a clear framework for the proper usage of PTSD and RTS testimony.
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tim into her car, demanded that she drive to a deserted road, and then raped
her. 12 Following this incident Strickland took her to his home, where the two
spent the night in his bedroom.1 3 The next morning he took the victim to an-
other location in Raleigh and released her. 14
At trial Strickland's roommate, who was present during the night in ques-
tion, testified that he heard lovemaking sounds coming from Strickland's bed-
room.
1 5 He also stated that he followed Strickland and the victim on the
following morning and witnessed the victim kissing Strickland good-bye as he
got out of her car.' 6 The State called four witnesses to contradict this testi-
mony, 17 including Dr. Susan Roth, a clinical psychologist, who testified that the
victim's symptoms were consistent with PTSD.18 The defense objected, but the
court allowed her testimony,19 and the jury later convicted Strickland of second
degree rape.20
On appeal the defense argued that Dr. Roth was not qualified to offer testi-
mony on PTSD and, further, that testimony regarding PTSD is inadmissible in
rape trials.21 In a perfunctory opinion the appellate court disagreed. The court
first found Dr. Roth qualified 22 and then followed a line of cases from various
states that held PTSD testimony admissible in rape trials by affirming the allow-
ance of Dr. Roth's testimony. 23 The court also found support for its decision in
a dissenting opinion from Judge Martin in an earlier case, in which he argued
that PTSD is relevant in rape cases,24 and in the recent case of State v. Clem-
Mons, 25 which implied that PTSD is now admissible in rape cases.2 6 The North




16. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 63.
17. Three of these witnesses testified that the defendant had urged his roommate to exaggerate
and lie to the police about the incident, and that the roommate initially gave more "exaggerated"
and deceptive responses to police questions. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 64.
18. Id. at 645, 387 S.E.2d at 64. She also testified as to the nature of PTSD and its appearance
in rape victims. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 644, 387 S.E.2d at 63.
21. Id. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 64-65.
22. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65. The court noted Dr. Roth's position as an associate professor
at Duke University and her extensive research in the areas of sexual trauma, sexual aggression,
stress, coping, and helplessness. Id.
23. Id. at 646-48, 387 S.E.2d at 65-66. The court recognized, but rejected, another line of cases
holding PTSD or RTS inadmissible and also mentioned that the American Psychiatric Association
recognizes PTSD. Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIArNosTIc AND STATIST-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM III]).
24. Specifically, Judge Martin asserted that PTSD is relevant "'to assist jurors in understand-
ing the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom.'" Id. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66
(quoting State v. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. 13, 24, 334 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1985) (Martin, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986)).
25. 319 N.C. 192, 353 S.E.2d 209 (1987). In concluding that admission of testimony regarding
the defendant's prior sexual misconduct was improper but harmless error, the court pointed to
PTSD testimony as a deciding factor supporting the defendant's conviction.
Considering the general consistency between the victim's testimony and her pre-trial state-
ments and conduct, the evidence that the victim's house was in disarray following what the
defendant contended was a consensual sexual union, and particularly the medical evidence
[Vol. 691626
Carolina Supreme Court subsequently denied discretionary review. 27
Traditionally in rape cases the victims have undergone two ordeals-the
initial rape and the equally traumatic trial procedure. 28 Ironically, society's fear
and loathing of this crime helped shift attention to the victim rather than her
attacker. 29 Virtually the entire inquiry has centered on the victim's behavior,
appearance, and past conduct.30 This skewed focus resulted from a number of
popular misconceptions regarding rape and its victims. 31 First and foremost,
society and the courts have viewed rape as a sexual crime rather than as one of
violence. 32 Thus, the investigation often hinged on the impact the victim's be-
havior and appearance had upon her assailant. If she expressed, in any manner,
a desire for his affections, the attacker could seize upon a ready-made defense to
his crime.33 Similarly, the fear of false accusations of rape and the perception
that "'it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent ... than a
of the victim's severe post-traumatic stress disorder for a lengthy period immediately fol-
lowing the incident, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would
not have convicted defendant even if the evidence in question had not been admitted for
any purpose.
Id. at 199-200, 353 S.E.2d at 213.
26. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66 (citing Clemmons, 319 N.C. at 199, 353
S.E.2d at 213).
27. State v. Strickland, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
28. See N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 1, at 129-30; Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribu-
lation. Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1977); Bohmer, Judicial Atti-
tudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 303 (1974). Bohmer stated that "[v]ictims
frequently report that their encounters with the police, district attorneys and courtroom personnel
were more traumatic than the rape incident itself." Bohmer, supra, at 303.
29. One author explains the tendency to concentrate on the victim rather than the actual crime
observed:
"[IThe mention of rape makes us all uneasy-for different reasons depending on who we
are.... [Tihe thoughtful normal man, after hearing the details of a forcible rape, finds it
difficult to believe.... He knows that all thoughts of sex-which he equates with fun,
romance, and mutual admiration-would leave him if the woman were really struggling to
get free .... He does not realize that, to the rapist, the act is not 'love,' nor ardor, and
usually not even passion; it is a way of debasing and degrading a woman.... This gives
rise to the commonly held view that: 'There is no such thing as rape.'. . . To most women,
[rape] is almost as unreal as it is to most men because they themselves have not experienced
it, and few people who have done so are in the habit of talking about it....
At the same time, an occasional newspaper story about a particularly brutal rape-
murder makes all women shudder. They wonder if it could possibly happen to them, and if
it did, how would they react....
One way of coping ... is to imagine, and then believe, that women to whom rape
happens are in some way vastly different from oneself. Deciding that they must have been
taller, shorter, fatter, thinner, older, or younger will not work since rape victims come in all
variations of these attributes. It is far easier to settle on some impalpable quality which is
not so easily measured with ruler or scale. This accounts for the overwhelming number of
women who believe that most claims of being raped are either outright lies, or that the
rapes were brought on by the victim herself .. "
Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its
Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395, 399 n.27 (1985) (quoting C.
HURSCH, THE TROU3LE WITH RAPE 5-7 (1977)).
30. Berger, supra note 28, at 12-15; Note, supra note 3, at 1661-62.
31. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
32. See Note, supra note 3, at 1657.
33. See supra note 1.
1991] EVIDENCE 1627
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
virtuous woman' -34 led to a system that put the victim on trial along with her
attacker.
Consequently, the issue of consent is central in most rape trials. The North
Carolina rape statute provides: "A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if
the person engages in vaginal intercourse... [w]ith another person by force and
against the will of the other person. .... -35 Hence, any evidence implying that
the victim assented to the accused's sexual advances becomes relevant to
whether a rape occurred. Traditionally courts allowed any testimony tending to
show victim consent or a failure to resist physically, 36 including evidence of the
victim's prior sexual history.37 This practice caused rape trials to revolve
around the victim's behavior and personal history.33
In response to growing pressures for a solution to the imbalances in rape
trials39 virtually all states have enacted rape shield statutes, which limit explora-
tion into the victim's past.40 North Carolina passed a rape shield statute in 1977
strictly confining explorations into the victim's past sexual behavior.4 ' On sev-
eral occasions the North Carolina courts have upheld the constitutionality of
this statute and" '[rejected] the notion that all sexual behavior, however proved,
has some intrinsic relevance in a sexual assault proceeding, and [required] a
34. Berger, supra note 28, at 15 (quoting People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30,
33 (1962)). In fact, while the F.B.I. reported that on a national average 15% of all rape reports were
'unfounded' and research based on police statistics turned up even higher percentages, studies per-
formed by medical and social workers yield much lower figures (from 1 to 7%). These differences
were explained by the fact that the police statistics included cases not investigated because the of-
ficers believed that the victim was lying. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 5, at 208-14.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a) (1986). For a similar description of second-degree rape, see
i. § 14-27.3 (a)(1) (requiring force against the will of another person).
36. State v. Dill, 184 N.C. 645, 652, 113 S.E. 609, 613 (1922) (allowing testimony that the
victim failed to cry out and subsequently failed to report the rape for three days as relevant to her
credibility and the issue of consent).
37. See, eg., State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399, 409, 245 S.E.2d 743, 750 (1978); State v. Goss, 293
N.C. 147, 153, 235 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1977); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 191-92, 111 S.E.2d 1,
11-12 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917 (1960).
38. This focus upon the victim is a major reason for the massive underreporting of rapes. In
1978 only eight percent of the total number of rapes and attempted rape incidents were reported to
the police. Russell, The Prevalence and Incidence of Forcible Rape and Attempted Rape of Females,
7 VicriMoLoGy: AN INT'L J. 81, 81 (1982).
39. The pressure to reform has come from all angles, including the feminist movement, social
commentators, and changing public attitudes toward rape. Note, supra note 3, at 1657 n.1.
40. See Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MIN. L. REv. 763, 765 n.3 (1986) (noting that 48 jurisdictions have rejected the
notion that sexual acts of victims are per se admissible).
41. N.C.R. EVID. 412. This statute provides:
The sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless
such behavior:
(1) Was between the complaint [sic] and the defendant; or
(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of
showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant; or
(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resem-
bling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter.., as to tend to prove that com-
plainant consented to the act... or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant
reasonably to believe that the complainant consented; or
(4) Is evidence of sexual behavior offered as the basis of expert psychological or
psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged.
[Vol. 691628
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more specific showing of relevance before such behavior can be proved.' "42
These decisions reflect a concerted effort by the courts to protect rape victims
from defense counsel's arguably prejudicial 43 attempts at uncovering prior sex-
ual exploits.
At the same time that the state legislatures began to enact rape shield stat-
utes, two researchers published a report on an acute stress reaction observed in
rape victims following the event.44 Labelling this condition rape trauma syn-
drome (RTS), 45 Burgess and Holmstrom divided the stress reaction into two
phases. In the initial "acute phase" the victim experiences both physical and
emotional reactions. The physical effects include shock, muscle tension, and
gastrointestinal irritability, while the emotional effects range from fear, anger,
humiliation, and a desire for revenge to an outwardly calm presence that masks
inner torment.46 During this phase the victim most acutely feels the impact of
the rape, although her expressions can range a wide gamut.47 In the subsequent
reorganization phase the victim undergoes a long-term process of redefine-
ment.48 The symptoms of this phase include change in lifestyle and residence,
nightmares, and phobic reactions.4 9 Although these symptoms vary in degree
and sequence, few victims report an absence of any symptoms. 50
A number of researchers questioned the methodology of the Burgess and
Holmstrom study and other, similar studies that followed it.51 Specifically, they
criticized the lack of a control group, the selective nature of the sample group,
and the lack of long-term assessment of the subjects.52 Furthermore, several
42. State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 37, 269 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1980) (quoting DETAILED COM-
MENTS ON DRAFT LAW, LEGISLATIvE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY
OF NORTH CAROLINA: SEXUAL ASSAULTS 92 (1977)); accord State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 743-
44, 370 S.E.2d 363, 370 (1988).
43. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966). But see Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 544 (1980).
Tanford and Bocchino argue that the rape shield laws are ineffective in reducing jury prejudice and
violate the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to introduce evidence when the probative value
outweighs prejudicial effects. Tanford & Bocchino, supra at 545, 572-78.
44. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5. The researchers conducted
a one-year study of 92 adult victims of forcible rape. These victims were selected from 146 patients
admitted to the emergency ward of Boston City Hospital. Id. at 981.
45. Id. at 981. DSM III recognizes a finite number of other psychologically traumatic events as
causes of PTSD, including military combat, natural disasters, accidental disasters (such as severe car
accidents or airplane disasters), fires, collapsed buildings, and deliberately caused traumas (such as
torture, death camps, and bombing). Common experiences such as loss of loved ones, illnesses,
business losses, and marital conflict do not cause PTSD. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247-48 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [here-
inafter DSM III-R].
46. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, at 982.
47. Id. at 982-83.
48. Id. at 983-84.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 983.
51. See Ruch & Leon, Type of SexualAssault Trauma: A Multidimensional Analysis of a Short-
term Panel, 8 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 237, 238-39 (1983); S. KATz & M. MAzUR, supra note 5,
at 20-27.
52. See, eg., Ruch & Leon, supra note 51, at 238-39; Note, supra note 3, at 1670-75; Note,
Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument For Limited Admissibility-State v.
Black, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1065 n.9 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Expert Testimony].
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researchers argued that the studies failed to identify any reactions specific to
rape.5 3
In response to these criticisms researchers recently have performed a
number of studies designed to correct the methodological flaws of the Burgess
and Holmstrom research.5 4 Most of these studies have used control groups of
non-rape victims, a battery of standardized psychological tests, and a wider sam-
pling of subjects.55 The results of these more scientific tests did not contradict
Burgess and Holmstrom's findings.5 6 On the contrary, they reinforced and ex-
tended the conclusion that rape victims consistently suffer higher levels of fear,
anxiety, depression, and anger than nonvictims.57 As a result of the original and
subsequent studies confirming the trauma associated with rape, the American
Psychiatric Association, in the 1980 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III), recognized rape as one of a small
number of causes of PTSD.5 8 RTS represents one of several sub-categories of
PTSD, which a number of especially traumatic stressors can cause.5 9 PTSD
generally causes the sufferer to re-experience the traumatic event,6° feel es-
tranged from others, 61 exhibit fear and avoidance of the stimuli associated with
the event,62 and display and feel a wide range of emotions.63 Not only have the
recent studies confirmed rape victims' symptoms that correspond with PTSD,64
but at least one researcher has contended that rape victims as a group exhibit
53. In fact, the original study by Burgess and Holmstrom found similar reactions among rape
and attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, at 982.
Another study concluded that RTS reactions could result from any stressful sexual situation.
Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
408, 408 (1976). Some courts later cited these studies as evidence that PTSD or RTS represented a
therapeutic technique and could not be used as a fact-finding tool. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d
236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984).
Even more disturbing were results compiled by Symonds, which indicated that similar trauma
could result from any violent crime. Specifically, Symonds compared rape and robbery victims and
found similar victim responses. Symonds, The Rape Victim: Psychological Patterns of Response, 36
Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 27 (1976).
54. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Able, Sequelae of Sexual Assault: The Survivor's Perspective, in
THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 240 (1983); Ellis, A Review
of Empirical Rape Research: Victim Reactions and Response to Treatment, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL-
OGY REV. 473 (1983); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, supra note 5.
55. See eg., studies cited supra note 54.
56. Id.
57. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Abel, supra note 54, at 249, 253; Ellis, supra note 54, at 477.
58. DSM III, supra note 23, at 236. The revised third edition of the DSM III continues to
recognize rape as a cause of PTSD. DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247.
59. See supra note 45.
60. DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247.
61. Id. at 248.
62. Id. This avoidance of anything associated with the event can result in partial amnesia with
respect to the rape, a sudden change in lifestyle to avoid reminders of the incident (such as a change
in residence if the rape took place in the victim's home), and even a decreased response to all stimuli
known as "psychic numbing." Id. at 248-49.
63. Id. at 247-49. As shown in the original Burgess and Holmstrom study, see Burgess &
Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, supra note 5, these emotional symptoms can range from open
displays of terror, depression, and anger to a stoic exterior that hides the inner torment of the victim.
DSM III-R, supra note 45, at 247-49.
64. See Burgess & Holmstrom, RTS and PTSD, supra note 5, at 46; Martin, Warfield & Braen,
Physician's Management of the Psychological Aspects of Rape, 249 J. A.M.A. 501 (1983).
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symptoms more severe than those shown by almost any other group of PTSD
sufferers.65
As the documentation of PTSD (and its sub-category RTS) emerged in sup-
port of Burgess and Holmstrom's original conclusions,66 the specter of its possi-
ble use in rape trials began to loom largely. Properly. classified as scientific
testimony, PTSD evidence must meet both the general requirements of rele-
vance6 7 and the test for admitting expert testimony.6 8 This testimony may "em-
brace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact," 69 but it cannot invade
the province of the jury by simply telling the jury how to decide an issue.70 In
addition, evidence of PTSD must meet the jurisdiction's admissibility test for
novel scientific theories. Many states apply the so-called Frye test,71 which re-
quires that the scientific community "generally accept" the theory before courts
may sanction its use.72 This standard represents a strict and unyielding ap-
proach towards novel scientific theories, and many argue it goes too far by bar-
ring highly reliable and relevant testimony. 73 Not only must the PTSD evidence
cross the Frye barrier, but it must also withstand the skepticism surrounding
psychological testimony in general. 74
Many states, however, have rejected the Frye test for novel scientific tech-
niques and instead admit such techniques if they are reliable.75 North Carolina
courts, in particular, use this "reliability standard." 76 Although the technique
65. Wilson, Smith & Johnson, supra note 5, at 157 (determining that only PTSD caused by
combat in Vietnam surpasses the suffering rape victims endure).
66. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
67. Relevancy consists of evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." N.C.R. EVID. 401.
68. Because PTSD evidence relies on an expert's diagnosis and testimony, it must meet the
requirements of rule 702. Thus, the witness must qualify as an expert and his or her testimony must
assist the trier of fact in making its conclusions. N.C.R. EVID. 702.
69. N.C.R. EvID. 704.
70. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee notes (The Federal Rule is identical to the North
Carolina version of 704.). In the context of PTSD, this means that the expert may explain PTSD
and, depending on the jurisdiction, testify that the victim suffers from PTSD. Neither the expert nor
the court, however, may order the jury to connect the PTSD to the rape or even to accept the
expert's opinion.
71. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72. Id. at 1014. General acceptance among the scientific community can be shown through use
of the theory in other cases, and discussion in law review articles and other scholarly or authoritative
materials. Massaro, supra note 29, at 434-35.
73. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1223-24 (1980).
74. The fear surrounding psychological testimony is that it relies too much on theory, cannot
be validated, and draws impermissible conclusions for the trier of fact. Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science" An Analysis Of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 618 (1978).
Contra, Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The
Case For Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. RIv. 427, 463-66 (1980) (arguing that any shortcomings
in the psychological testimony may be countered by cross-examination and limiting instructions and,
furthermore, that psychological testimony is highly relevant and accurate).
75. Massaro, supra note 29, at 435. Of course, general acceptance can bolster a claim for relia-
bility. Id.
76. See State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 147, 322 S.E.2d 370, 380 (1984); State v. Temple, 302
N.C. 1, 12, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981) (citing State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 74, 140 S.E.2d 705,706
(1965)).
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must be established and recognized, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State
v. Bullard specifically rejected the Frye test as the exclusive standard for admissi-
bility, and recognized reliability as the chief test.77
The increasing presence of PTSD as an established and documented tech-
nique and North Carolina's "reliability standard" for novel scientific techniques
set the stage for an attempt to use evidence of the syndrome in a North Carolina
rape trial. In 1986 the inevitable occurred in State v. Stafford,78 when the State
attempted to offer testimony showing the complainant suffered from RTS.79
The victim in Stafford was a thirteen year-old girl who accused her uncle of
raping her.80 At trial the pediatrician who examined the victim, when asked if
the victim suffered from RTS, testified that "I can't make any conclusions
whether or not this means she was raped. I can just say she fulfills some of the
criteria for the syndrome that has been defined, and that's all I can say."8 1 After
the jury convicted the defendant, he appealed, arguing that RTS testimony is
inadmissible under rule 702.82 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,
avoided the broad issue of whether expert testimony on RTS (or PTSD) is ad-
missible in rape trials, and determined instead that this particular testimony was
inadmissible as hearsay under rule 802.83 The supreme court affirmed on the
hearsay grounds and reiterated, "we do not deem it necessary to reach on this
record the question whether in a proper case testimony about rape trauma syn-
drome will be admissible in the courts of this state."'84 Although the majority on
both the court of appeals and the supreme court dodged the RTS issue, dissent-
ers in both cases argued that RTS testimony "as to the symptoms of the syn-
drome and its existence, is admissible to assist jurors in understanding the
evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom." 8 5 The majority's
position, in contrast, remained a mystery.8 6
While North Carolina danced around the PTSD admissibility question,
77. Bullard, 312 N.C. at 147, 322 S.E.2d at 380 (holding that, while the general acceptance of a
scientific technique does strengthen the likelihood of its admission into evidence, "[p]lainly, our
Court does not adhere exclusively to the Frye formula").
78. 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986). At the time Stafford came before the court, at least
four other states already had faced the PTSD question. See infra note 87.
79. Stafford, 317 N.C. at 571, 346 S.E.2d at 465.
80. Id. at 569, 346 S.E.2d at 464.
81. Id. at 571, 346 S.E.2d at 465-66. The doctor subsequently testified on the nature of RTS
and its causes. Id. at 571-72, 387 S.E.2d at 466.
82. See State v. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. 19, 20, 334 S.E.2d 799, 800 (1985), aff'd, 317 N.C. 568,
346 S.E.2d 463 (1986).
83. Id. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 800. The court ruled that the statements given to the doctor by the
victim constituted inadmissible hearsay and did not fall under the exception to hearsay in North
Carolina Rules of Evidence 803(4), which renders admissible statements made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 21, 331 S.E.2d at 801. For an argument that the court misap-
plied the hearsay rules to avoid the PTSD question, see Note, State v. Stafford: Rape Trauma Syn-
drome and the Admissibility of Statements Made by Rape Victims, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1364, 1370
(1986).
84. Stafford, 317 N.C. at 575, 346 S.E.2d at 468.
85. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 26, 334 S.E.2d at 803 (Martin, J., dissenting); Stafford, 317 N.C.
at 576, 346 S.E.2d at 468 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Becton, in contrast, concurred in the court
of appeals decision and argued that RTS had not gained sufficient scientific reliability to be admissi-
ble. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 22, 334 S.E.2d at 801 (Becton, J., concurring).
86. Later, in State v. Goodwin, the court again avoided the PTSD controversy by holding that
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other states squarely confronted it. At the time of Stafford four other state
supreme courts had ruled directly on the use of PTSD in rape trials.87 Of these,
three either severely limited or completely excluded the evidence.88 These
courts, and those that later followed their decisions,89 relied on three major ar-
guments to justify their holdings: reliability concerns, lack of helpfulness to the
jury, and the danger of prejudice.
First, these courts concluded that PTSD was not sufficient to meet the stan-
dards required for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. In addition to
the methodological shortcomings of the early studies, which cast "grave doubt"
on the reliability of PTSD (and RTS),90 the courts rejecting PTSD testimony
contended that PTSD was devised to assist victims in overcoming their trauma
rather than to test the accuracy of the victims' contentions. 91 One court con-
cluded that "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic
tool useful in counseling."92 In effect, this argument did not dispute the general
acceptance of PTSD as a counseling technique, but viewed PTSD as an inappro-
priate fact-finding method. Furthermore, some courts decided that the difficulty
of determining the cause of the syndrome makes evidence of RTS or PTSD in-
herently unreliable.93 Because other stressors might represent the real cause of
PTSD, reliability problems present a serious danger.94
The second major reason some courts rejected PTSD and RTS testimony
was doubt as to whether its introduction assists the jury enough to merit its
admissibility.95 Essentially this contention rests on the notion that the jury's
the expert offering the PTSD testimony was not qualified to testify as an expert. 320 N.C. 147, 151,
357 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1987).
87. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460
(1984) (rejecting testimony of a rape counselor that indicated a rape had occurred); State v. Marks,
231 Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (admitting RTS testimony to show nonconsent to
intercourse); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting RTS testimony where it
alleged the victim was a victim of rape and had not fantasized the event); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 241-42 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (rejecting RTS testimony offered on the issue of consent).
88. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
at 232; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241-42.
89. See, eg., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 289-90, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136-38, 552 N.Y.S.2d
883, 888-89 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 358-59 (1988);
State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 347-50 745 P.2d 12, 18-19 (1987).
90. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 345, 745 P.2d at 17; see supra text accompanying notes 51-53. For a
description of later studies that purported to correct the methodological shortcomings, see supra text
accompanying notes 54-65.
91. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The court stated:
We emphasize that our conclusion in this regard is not intended to suggest that rape
trauma syndrome is not generally recognized or used in the general scientific community
[from] which it arose, but only that it is not relied on in that community for the purpose for
which the prosecution sought to use it in this case, namely, to prove that a rape occurred.
Id.
92. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
93. See id. at 229; State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Black, 109 Wash.
2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16-17. "Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accu-
rately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may fol-
low any psychologically traumatic event." Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229. For the contrary view that
only a finite number of traumatic events may cause PTSD, see supra note 45.
94. See Note, supra note 3, at 1699.
95. See, eg., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 238.
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common sense suffices to determine whether a rape occurred. 96 Due to what
they perceived as the questionable validity of the technique and the inherent
dangers of psychological testimony, 97 these courts found a decision based on the
facts alone more desirable.98
A concern troubling the courts that is related to this second line of reason-
ing was that admitting PTSD might result in a satellite "battle of the experts."
One court argued that "[tjo allow such [PTSD] testimony would inevitably lead
to a battle of experts that would invade the jury's province of fact-finding and
add confusion rather than clarity." 99 The courts feared that instead of assisting
the jury, PTSD testimony would waste valuable time and only cloud the is-
sue.100 An even larger problem introduced by a "battle of the experts" is the
potential to reawaken the traditional focus on the victim.' 0 ' Logically, if the
prosecution introduces evidence of PTSD, the defendant should maintain the
ability to cross-examine the witness regarding all possible causes of the victim's
trauma.'02 Thus, any sexually stressful or otherwise painful event becomes rele-
vant as a possible alternative to rape as the cause of the PTSD. Similarly, the
defendant could argue that the court should allow his expert not only to testify
regarding PTSD's reliability, but also to examine the victim to determine if, in
the expert's estimation, rape or some other trauma caused the victim's symp-
toms. 10 3 This "battle of the experts" could cost the legal system time, confuse
the jury, and focus the jury's attention once again upon the victim.
Lurking behind both the reliability concerns and the contention that PTSD
will not assist the jury is the third overriding concern of courts that have re-
jected PTSD and RTS: the fear of undue prejudice.1°4 The first courts to ad-
dress the admissibility of PTSD testimony believed that the danger of undue
prejudice far outweighs the evidence's marginal reliability and only slightly as-
96. In refusing to admit RTS testimony the Taylor court held that expert testimony "'should
never be admitted unless it is clear that the jurors themselves are not capable, for want of experience
or knowledge of the subject, to draw correct conclusions from the facts proved.'" Taylor, 663
S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)).
97. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
98. See Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Taylor, 663 N.W.2d at 238-39; State v. Black, 109 Wash.
2d 336, 350, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987).
99. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
100. Frazier & Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma
Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 101, 116-17 (1988).
101. See Note, supra note 3, at 1703-04. The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant the
right to probe the victim's psychological or sexual history if she offers PTSD evidence. Id. at 1704.
102. See, eg., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741,751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211
Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
103. One court noted:
Cross-examination can include not only cross-examining the expert about PTSD in gen-
eral, but also cross-examining the expert and the prosecutrix about possible causes of the
disorder other than the assault charged in the criminal case. In addition, we can foresee
cases where the defendant will seek to counter the State's PTSD evidence with his own
expert testimony. That can, in turn, lead to issues concerning compulsory psychiatric ex-
amination of the complainant by an expert for the defense.
Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
104. See, eg., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. 1984) (en bane); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12, 18
(1987).
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sists the jury.10 5 Although in many later decisions the courts' focus shifted
away from reliability concerns, 10 6 the courts still restricted or prohibited PTSD
and RTS testimony on the basis that the prejudicial effects of the testimony
outweigh its probative value. 10 7 At the core of this view is the belief that expert
testimony that the victim suffers from PTSD automatically surrounds the vic-
tim's story with an impenetrable shield of credibility.10 8 This shield protects the
victim regardless of whether the expert actually comments on the credibility of
the victim,10 9 because, as commentators have suggested, the jury attaches
"mythic infallibility" to the expert. 110 Moreover, at least one court has argued
that allowing the expert to indicate, either expressly or implicitly, that the victim
suffers from PTSD invades the jury's fact-finding province, thereby relieving it
from deciding whether a rape actually occurred. 1 The majority of the early
decisions, therefore, either banned PTSD testimony outright or severely limited
its scope.
As more state courts tackled the PTSD issue, however, this early majority
position gradually became a minority viewpoint. 1 2 State v. Marks113 was the
105. "ITihe danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value [of RTS testimony.]" Sal-
dana, 324 N.W.2d at 230. See, ag., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203
Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984); Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 238.
106. At least one court that completely precluded PTSD or RTS testimony in rape trials, how-
ever, focused on the earlier concerns of the technique's inherent unreliability as a fact-finding device.
See Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 345-46, 745 P.2d at 17.
107. Courts recently deciding this issue have viewed the danger of prejudice as greatly increased
when the prosecution uses PTSD or RTS testimony with respect to the issue of consent or to bolster
the victim's credibility, as opposed to offering it merely to educate the jury on the trauma associated
with rape. See, eg., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 139, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883,
891 (1990) (The court rejected the use of RTS testimony introduced to prove a rape occurred be-
cause "where it is introduced to prove the crime took place, its helpfulness is outweighed by the
possibility of undue prejudice."); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 358-
59 (1988) (reversing the appellate court's ruling that RTS testimony was admissible when offered to
bolster the credibility of the victim's identification of the rapist). These courts recognized PTSD and
RTS testimony as valid and reliable scientific tools and did not bar such testimony given to explain
the victim's behavior, but ruled that the prejudice associated with the expert's validating the victim's
claim that a rape occurred outweighed any probative value of expert testimony on the issue of con-
sent. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 293, 552 N.E.2d at 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
The argument over the prejudicial effects of RTS and PTSD testimony forms the center of the
continuing controversy surrounding PTSD testimony. Most modem courts recognize the reliability
of the technique, but split when this testimony appears on the issue of consent. One court facing the
PTSD question has remarked that
[the admission of PTSD or RTS testimony] is an almost unanimous uniform rule when the
expert neither uses the term "rape trauma syndrome" nor offers an opinion on whether the
victim had been raped. However, if the expert testifies on these two matters, the courts are
approximately evenly split on the admissibility of such evidence.
State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1989). Even courts that admit PTSD or RTS testimony on
the consent issue remain sensitive to the dangers of prejudice and attempt to neutralize them. See
infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
108. The Saldana court contended that the expert testimony "'gave a stamp of scientific legiti-
macy to the truth of the complaining witness's factual testimony.'" Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231
(quoting People v. Izzo, 90 Mich. App. 727, 730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
109. Of course, if the expert comments that the victim is not fantasizing the rape and her story is
credible, the danger of undue prejudice becomes far more imminent. Id.
110. See Note, supra note 3, at 1702.
111. See, eg., State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12, 18 (1987).
112. For a list of the states admitting PTSD or RTS to show the victim's behavior was similar to
other PTSD sufferers, see Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
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first case to uphold the admissibility of RTS or PTSD. 114 Contrary to the deci-
sions that questioned the technique's validity, 115 the Kansas Supreme Court
firmly rooted its decision in the belief that PTSD is a reliable diagnostic tech-
nique.1 16 Other courts admitting PTSD testimony also accepted it as reliable
and accurate, 117 regardless of its therapeutic origins. 11 8
Courts admitting PTSD evidence responded to the fear that the syndrome
can appear as a result of a number of other stressors 19 by pointing to the nar-
row range of stressors that can cause PTSD 120 and arguing that cross-examina-
tion offers the defendant an opportunity to suggest any other possible cause.12 1
Of course this contention raises fears that defendants will cross-examine to cir-
cumvent rape shield laws that limit inquiry into the victim's past. 122 In State v.
McQuillen the Kansas Supreme Court encountered this argument, but dismissed
it stating "[s]afeguards are still contained within the statute to protect the vic-
tim. A showing of relevancy is still necessary before the complaining witness'
prior sexual conduct may be admitted into evidence on behalf of the defend-
ant."123 Thus, since only possible causes of PTSD are relevant to the causation
issue, the court can still prevent attempts to examine recklessly every facet of the
victim's life.
Additionally, evidence of trauma recently has been allowed in cases involv-
ing battered children,124 battered women, 125 and insanity defenses. 12 6 Hence,
113. 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
114. Id. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
115. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
116. Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299. Most commentators, in light of later studies
validating the syndrome, agree with this perspective. One study shows that the scientific community
overwhelmingly accepts the reliability of the PTSD concept and supports its use in court. See Fra-
zier & Borgida, supra note 100, at 111; see also supra text accompanying notes 54-65 (examining
studies that have documented the intense emotional reactions consistently suffered by rape victims).
117. See, eg., Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Allewalt,
308 Md. 89, 107, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986) (quoting Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299);
State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
118. While some courts have held that the therapeutic origins of PTSD and RTS severely dimin-
ished their value as scientifically reliable techniques, recent commentators have argued instead that
the bases of PTSD and RTS have no effect on their reliability and accuracy as evidentiary tools. See,
e-g., Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 52, at 1075-76.
119. See supra note 93.
120. Only a narrow range of abnormal traumatic events can cause PTSD. See supra note 45.
Absent a showing of one of these events, the victim's past is irrelevant.
121. See, eg.,Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751; Liddell, 211 Mont. at 188-89, 685 P.2d
at 923.
122. In State v. McQuillen, the defense argued that admitting RTS testimony "provides a legal
method by which the defendant can evade [the rape shield statute.]" 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d
822, 830 (1984). For an explanation of the protections offered by rape shield statutes, see supra notes
40-43 and accompanying text.
123. McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830.
124. In People v. Bledsoe the court recognized the admissibility of "battered child syndrome,"
which indicates that a child with severe injuries has not sustained these injuries by accidental means.
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P.2d 291, 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458-59 (1984). However, the court
went on to distinguish battered child syndrome as medical testimony on the cause of a particular
physical injury, whereas RTS represented an opinion about the psychological state of the victim. Id.
125. A number of courts have recently allowed testimony on battered woman syndrome. See
Note, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women who Kill Passive Abusers, 68
N.C.L. REv. 1159, 1165 n.44 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Norman]; Note, A Trend Emerges: A State
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courts have admitted PTSD to maintain consistency with their approach to
other psychological traumas. 127
Courts that allow PTSD testimony view the evidence as potentially very
helpful in explaining to the jury the victim's reactions to rape.'12 Specifically,
they have pointed to documented misconceptions jurors often hold regarding
rape and its victims. 129 Thus, PTSD evidence, for example, may explain effec-
tively the victim's reluctance to report the crime or other behavior following the
rape.130
Some courts also view PTSD as relevant to whether the victim actually
consented. 13 1 To meet the criteria for relevance, evidence must tend to make a
fact at issue more or less probable than it would be otherwise. 132 On this partic-
ular subject, Professor Massaro has commented:
That definition makes psychological "bruises" as relevant as physical
bruises in a consent-rape trial. Both certainly may result from many
causes. Neither the physician who testifies that a woman has physical
bruises nor a psychologist who testifies that a woman suffers from RTS
can state unequivocally that the condition was caused by a specific in-
cident of non-consensual intercourse, yet the evidence of a victim's
physical injuries is deemed clearly relevant in a rape case and admissi-
bility of this is beyond doubt.' 33
PTSD evidence, then, makes it more probable that a rape did in fact occur,
Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J.
FAM. L. 373 (1986). Battered woman syndrome results from the interaction of a series of abusive
actions. As a result the woman becomes unable to leave the relationship, notify the authorities, or
solicit help from friends or family. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (ex-
plaining battered woman syndrome as a cycle of violence consisting of three stages: tension building,
acute battering, and contrition); Note, Norman, supra, at 1165-68.
126. In comparing RTS to insanity defense cases, one court held that "experts have traditionally
been allowed to testify on numerous issues ultimately to be decided by the jury." Kruse v. State, 483
So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
127. Some commentators argue, however, that insanity and battered women syndrome expert
testimony is completely different from RTS testimony because only the defendant may initiate it.
Thus, the defendant's control over the admission of this testimony serves as some protection,
whereas no similar protection for the defendant exists in regard to RTS. Courts therefore should not
analogize between the admissibility of RTS or PTSD and other admissible syndromes. See Note,
supra note 3, at 1693-95.
128. Because of its helpfulness to the jury the testimony fulfills the evidentiary requirements for
admissibility. N.C.R. EvID. 702.
129. See, eg., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
457 (1984) (reserving the possibility that RTS could be used to educate the jurors on the subject of
rape and its victims, even though RTS was not allowed on the issue of consent). In a study of
average citizens' understanding of rape based upon a fourteen-question quiz, "the scores showed
that, in general, most people knew very little about the facts regarding rape. The average score of
the respondents on the fourteen-item test was less than four items correct." H. FEILD & L. BIENEN,
JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 89 (1980).
130. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; People v. Taylor, 75
N.Y.2d 277, 286, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 891 (1990); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d
1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987).
131. See, eg., State v. McQuiilen, 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d 822, 829 (1984); State v. Al-
lewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685 P.2d
918, 923 (1984).
132. N.C.R. EVID. 401.
133. Massaro, supra note 29, at 440-41 (footnote omitted).
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according to courts that accept its reliability as a diagnostic tool.' 34
Despite its use as a diagnostic tool, most courts have decided to admit
PTSD testimony because "although the admission of evidence of this nature has
a prejudicial impact on the defendant's claim of innocence, the probative value
of this testimony clearly outweighs the prejudicial value." 13 5 Central to this view
is the notion that juries do not rely on experts as "mythically infallible," but
weigh expert testimony just as they would any other evidence. 136 Moreover,
these courts have reasoned that expert testimony on RTS or PTSD does not
invade the province of the jury, but only assists the jury in deciding the ultimate
issues. 137 Cross-examination allows the defense to point out any inherent defi-
ciencies in the testimony and protect against any danger of undue prejudice. 138
In recognition of the inherent prejudicial dangers of per se admissibility of
PTSD testimony, 139 few courts that admit PTSD testimony do so uncondition-
ally. 14 Some courts require specific jury instructions stressing to the jury that
the expert testimony is not a legal conclusion and carries only the same weight
as other evidence. 14 1 Many courts allow the expert to explain the symptoms of
PTSD and to state that the victim exhibits similar symptoms, but do not allow
the expert to address the credibility of the victim. 142 Still other courts allow
PTSD testimony only to explain the victim's post-rape behavior, which the jury
might find nonsensical or unusual (such as failing to report the rape immedi-
ately).'43 Finally, a few courts continue to forbid completely PTSD testimony
in rape trials.144
As the battle over PTSD and RTS admissibility continued in other state
courts, North Carolina courts increasingly began to indicate that they would
134. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
135. State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984) (allowing RTS
evidence to explain a child victim's behavior). For a holding that the probative value outweighs
possible prejudice when RTS evidence alleges lack of consent, see State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 63,
699 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1985).
136. Allewalt, 308 Md. at 102, 517 A.2d at 748.
137. See, eg., Huey, 145 Ariz. at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294; State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647
P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
138. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751; State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 188, 685
P.2d 918, 923 (1984).
139. See Huey, 145 Aria, at 63, 699 P.2d at 1294.
140. The list of states that allow per se admissibility is fairly short. See, e.g., id.; People v.
Douglas, 183 I11. App. 3d 241, 256-57, 538 N.E.2d 1335, 1344 (1989), cert. denied, 127 111. 2d 625,
546 N.E.2d 1141 (1989); Marks, 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299; Liddell, 211 Mont. at 188, 685
P.2d at 923.
141. "[B]y proper jury instructions... the trial court can prevent any impression that the psy-
chiatric opinion is like a chemical reaction." Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
142. See, eg., Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Simmons v.
State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987); Allewalt, 308 Md. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751; State v.
McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 736-37 (W. Va. 1988).
143. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460
(1984) (refusing to allow RTS testimony to disprove consent, but expressly reserving the possibility
that RTS is admissible to dispel the juror's misconceptions on rape victims); People v. Taylor, 75
N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 891 (1990) (same); Scadden v. State,
732 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987) (expert testimony allowed to explain the victim's delay in reporting
the rape).
144. See, ag., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 349, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987).
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allow such testimony. State v. Clemmons, decided in 1987, involved a rape oc-
curring in the victim's home. 145 On appeal of his conviction, the defendant con-
tended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior misconduct
towards another female. 146 Although recognizing the trial court's error in ad-
mitting this evidence, the supreme court refused to overturn the decision be-
cause of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. 147 The court relied
"particularly [on] the medical evidence of the victim's severe post-traumatic
stress disorder for a lengthy period immediately following the incident."' 148
While the PTSD evidence was not at issue in Clemmons, the court's reliance on
it indicated its willingness to accept such testimony, at least in some capacity, as
evidence in rape trials.
State v. Teeter149 followed on the heels of the Clemmons ruling and in-
volved expert testimony that the victim suffered from symptoms consistent with
those found in other rape victims. 150 Although the expert who testified on be-
half of the State never expressly used the term PTSD or RTS, the symptoms he
described closely mirrored PTSD evidence. 151 The court, rejecting the defend-
ant's characterization of the testimony as going to the credibility of the victim's
story,152 allowed the testimony. The court stated that "Dr. Short never testified
that the sexual acts related by [the victim] were committed by any particular
person, nor did he purport to express an opinion as to defendant's guilt or inno-
cence."' 153 Again this decision, and others like it,154 indicated the court's will-
ingness to admit testimony similar to PTSD evidence. 155
In Strickland the North Carolina Court of Appeals took the decisions in
Clemmons and Teeter to a new level by expressly allowing an expert to testify
that the victim suffered from PTSD.156 The court firmly rooted its decision in
the widespread acceptance of PTSD. 157 Not only is PTSD a reliable scientific
145. State v. Clemmons, 319 N.C. 192, 194, 353 S.E.2d 209, 210-11 (1987).
146. In an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility the prosecution cross-examined the
defendant about a prior incident. Allegedly the defendant had entered a woman's apartment, made
advances towards her, thrown her on a bed, got on top of her, and stopped only when the woman
managed to kick a ringing phone off the hook. Id. at 196-97, 353 S.E.2d at 212.
147. Id. at 199-200, 353 S.E.2d at 213-14.
148. Id. at 199, 353 S.E.2d at 213.
149. 85 N.C. App. 624, 355 S.E.2d 804, disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 175, 358 S.E.2d 67 (1987).
150. The expert, Dr. Short, testified that the victim's behavior following the rape resembled that
of other rape victims in that she suffered nightmares, appeared nervous, and expressed fear of her




154. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 31-32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366-67 (1987) (expert
testified that the victim's symptoms were characteristic of those exhibited by children who have
experienced sexual abuse); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 220-22, 365 S.E.2d 651, 656-57 (1988)
(expert testified about the victim's behavior during his examination).
155. In its brief to the court of appeals, the State contended, with regard to Teeter and other
similar cases, that "[b]oth this court and the North Carolina Supreme Court have held that an expert
witness may testify to general symptoms and characteristics of victims of sexual abuse and to state
an opinion that the behavior exhibited by the victim is consistent with ... other victims of sexual
abuse." Brief for the State at 20, Strickland (No. 8910SC41 1).
156. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648-49, 387 S.E.2d at 66.
157. Id. at 646-47, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
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method, but it also is generally accepted among the medical community,15 8
among legal commentators,15 9 and by a majority of the state courts.' 60 This
broader acceptance of PTSD testimony prevents the inconsistency that would
result if courts allowed experts to testify that a victim exhibited symptoms simi-
lar to those of other rape victims, but refused to allow the expert to mention the
medical symptoms suffered by rape victims. The mere label "PTSD" or "RTS"
should not invoke different admissibility rules. 16 1 Further, admission of PTSD
testimony serves to educate the jury concerning the popular misconceptions sur-
rounding rape and its victims.' 62
Using PTSD testimony to educate the jury is, however, a far cry from using
it to disprove consent, as the Strickland court allowed.' 63 The level of prejudice
rises dramatically when the expert discusses whether the sexual relations were
voluntary or forced, as opposed to merely explaining the victim's behavior or
commenting on the general severity of rape. 164  Surprisingly, the court in
Strickland made no mention of the possible prejudices surrounding use of PTSD
testimony for this purpose. Virtually every other court ruling on PTSD or RTS
has considered the impact the testimony might have on the defendant and has
provided some means to limit these dangers, or at least to explain how the rele-
vance of PTSD outweighs the prejudicial effects. 165 Judge Lewis' brief opinion
in Strickland, in contrast, does not raise, let alone address, these concerns.166
The court simply cited a number of cases as supporting the admissibility of
158. Frazier & Borgida, supra note 100, at I11.
159. See Massaro, supra note 29, at 460-70; Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 52, at 1074-86.
160. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65 (listing the state decisions allowing
PTSD and RTS testimony).
161. See Brief for the State at 20.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). The Bledsoe court stated, "We hasten to add that nothing in this opinion
is intended to imply that evidence of the emotional and psychological trauma that a complaining
witness suffers after an alleged rape is inadmissible in a rape prosecution." Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The Strickland court recognized Judge Martin's dissent in State v. Staf-
ford, which pointed out PTSD testimony's ability to assist the jury in understanding the plight of
rape victims:
"There is recognized scientific authority for the medical conclusion that there exists a com-
plex and unique number of physical and emotional symptoms exhibited by victims of rape,
which are similar, but not identical, to other post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. An
understanding of those symptoms, the unique reactions of victims of rape, is not within the
common knowledge or experience of most persons called upon to serve as jurors. There-
fore, expert testimony as to the symptoms of the syndrome and its existence, is admissible
to assist jurors in understanding the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions
therefrom."
Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 648, 387 S.E.2d at 66 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Stafford,
77 N.C. App. 19, 26, 334 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1985), aff'd 317 N.C. 568, 346 S.E.2d 463 (1986)).
163. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
164. When the expert offers his opinion that the victim did not consent or that a rape occurred,
the danger of the jury blindly accepting the victim's story is much greater than when the expert
merely talks about the nature of PTSD to educate the jury. See supra notes 104-11 and accompany-
ing text. In fact, some courts draw a sharp line between PTSD testimony on the issue of consent and
testimony to dispel the jury's misconceptions or explain the victim's behavior. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal.
3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d
131, 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890-91 (1990); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1047 (WVyo. 1987),
165. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
166. See Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 644-49, 387 S.E.2d at 63-66.
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PTSD or RTS,167 failing to acknowledge that these decisions comprised a wide
variety of specific restrictions on the testimony itself and the context in which
the testimony was used. 168 The Strickland opinion left open the question
whether PTSD and RTS testimony is per se admissible or whether its admissibil-
ity is limited to situations similar to the facts of Strickland. In Strickland the
State's expert testimony that the victim displayed symptoms consistent with
PTSD was offered to refute the defendant's contention that the victim con-
sented. 169 The expert neither explicitly addressed the victim's credibility nor
stated that she thought a rape had occurred;' 70 therefore, the court did not dis-
cuss whether an expert could testify directly on the credibility issue. Language
in the opinion, however, suggests that the court will confine expert testimony to
a more general realm. 17 1 The court, when citing the many state decisions al-
lowing PTSD, stated "[m]ost jurisdictions allow such testimony on PTSD, or on
rape trauma syndrome, or expert testimony regarding reactions or behavior con-
sistent with other victims of sexual assault."' 172 This comment indicates that the
court recognized the problems associated with PTSD testimony and might ad-
mit it only to show that the victim displayed symptoms consistent with PTSD.
This view represents the best approach to PTSD, because it lessens the possibil-
ity that the jury might abdicate its fact-finding duties by simply accepting the
expert's opinion that a rape did occur, and greatly reduces the likelihood of
undue prejudice resulting from PTSD testimony. The court's opinion in Strick-
land never expressly discussed any boundaries to PTSD testimony, and its ap-
proach to the prejudice issue remains a mystery with few clues.
An equally disturbing aspect of the Strickland opinion is the court's failure
to consider the scope of a defendant's cross-examination after the introduction
of PTSD testimony.' 73 The court never discussed whether a defendant will be
able to pry indiscriminately into the victim's past for an alternative cause of the
PTSD. Other courts have maintained that the defendant cannot escape rape
shield laws once PTSD testimony enters the case.1 74 By placing boundaries on
just what the defendant can explore as he tries to discredit the notion that rape,
rather than some other trauma, caused the victim's PTSD, these courts attempt
to prevent a return to a trial that focuses on the victim. Of course the court
must honor the defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers,' 75 so
167. See id. at 647, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
168. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. In fact, one of the decisions cited by the
Strickland court was later overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Gal-
lagher, 519 Pa. 291, 297, 547 A.2d 355, 359 (1988). In its haste the Strickland court mistakenly
cited the appellate decision that admitted RTS testimony. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 647, 387
S.E.2d at 65 (citing Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735 (1986), rev'd,
519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988)).
169. Strickland, 96 N.C. App. at 645-46, 387 S.E.2d at 64-65.
170. Id. at 646, 387 S.E.2d at 65.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 644-49, 387 S.E.2d at 63-66.
174. See State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d 822, 830 (1984); supra text accompa-
nying notes 122-23.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the right to cross-examine cannot be overly circumscribed. The court, however,
can limit the defendant's inquiry to relevant events without infringing on the
defendant's constitutional rights. 176
Closely related to the danger of a defendant using cross examination to
uncover skeletons from the victim's past is the question of mandatory psycho-
logical examination of the victim. 177 This question could arise in two situa-
tions.178 First, the defendant might seek psychological examination evidence in
response to the prosecution's PTSD or RTS evidence. Should the defendant
have access to the medical records of the expert, or can the defendant demand to
have his own expert examine the victim?1 79 At present, North Carolina courts
do not allow mandatory psychological exams,180 but commentators have argued
that if PTSD is available to disprove consent, the accused should have an equal
opportunity to have his own expert examine the victim.181 More dangerous is
the second possibility, that the defendant might someday attempt to use PTSD
to prove consent. For example, the defendant might demand an expert examina-
tion of the victim, and if she exhibits no PTSD symptoms he might then contend
that no rape occurred. Thus, PTSD could become a subterranean essential ele-
ment of rape, putting the onus on the victim to prove she suffered from PTSD or
face the contention that the absence of PTSD symptoms proves her consent to
sexual intercourse. To avoid these potential problems, courts must refuse the
defendant access to medical records unless the victim plans to introduce PTSD
evidence and must prevent defendants from initiating discussion of PTSD.1 82
The victim would maintain control over the PTSD issue, thereby preventing
PTSD from becoming a weapon of the defense.183 The North Carolina Court of
176. One court has taken this approach already as a means to limit the defendant's inquiry into
the victim's past. McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830 (1984).
177. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109-10, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986).
178. The Allewalt court foresaw both possibilities:
When a trial judge admits PTSD evidence.., the ruling necessarily carries certain baggage
with it.... [W]e can foresee cases where the defendant will seek to counter the State's
PTSD evidence with his own expert testimony. That can, in turn, lead to issues concerning
compulsory psychiatric examination of the complainant by an expert for the defense,
Lurking in the background is the nice question of whether the absence of PTSD is provable
by the accused in defense of a rape charge, as tending to prove that there was consent.
Id.
179. This issue recently came before the Ohio Court of Appeals when a defendant contended
that his counsel provided him an inadequate defense by failing to produce an expert witness to testify
that the victim did not suffer from RTS and, therefore, had consented to the defendant's sexual
advances. State v. Rose, No. 57573 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
Although the court refused to grant the defendant's motion for retrial because the decision not to
call an expert was a non-reviewable tactical decision, it recognized the possibility of defendants using
RTS testimony to prove consent. Id.
180. State v. Clontz, 305 N.C. 116, 123-24, 286 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1982) (holding that a trial judge
does not have the discretionary power to compel an unwilling witness to submit to a psychiatric
examination).
181. See Massaro, supra note 29, at 453-60; Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome" Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 417, 459-60
(1984).
182. Massaro, supra note 29, at 453-60.
183. This would create a situation similar to the use of the battered woman syndrome and the
insanity defense, where the defendant controls the evidence's admissibility. See Note, supra note 3,
at 1694-95.
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Appeals failed to consider these questions in its Strickland ruling, but assuredly
it will be forced to face them in future cases.
The failure of the court of appeals to address or provide for the major
problems associated with PTSD testimony, and the subsequent supreme court
decision to deny review, leaves uncertain the exact limits surrounding PTSD
testimony. 184 Boundaries must be placed on the use of PTSD, either now or in
subsequent cases. Rather than articulating these limits on a case-by-case basis,
efficiency mandates forming a blueprint for handling future difficulties. Virtu-
ally every court faced with the PTSD dilemma has recognized its inherent dan-
gers and established concrete limitations or, at least, discussed why the benefits
outweigh the risks of this form of testimony.18 5 Strickland offered the perfect
opportunity to form an effective PTSD strategy, but neither court seized it.
Thus, the difficult problems surrounding this issue will continue to appear until
the court establishes a consistent approach to PTSD and RTS testimony.186
Although the court made the correct preliminary decision to admit PTSD testi-
mony, it failed to lay the proper groundwork for consistent and fair admission of
the evidence by the trial courts.
Louis A. TROSCH, JR.
184. State v. Strickland, 326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.
186. State v. Hall presents the perfect chance for the court to establish this consistent approach,
but the supreme court must go further than the lower courts, which declared only that PTSD is
admissible to prove consent. 98 N.C. App. 1, 8, 390 S.E.2d 169, 172-73, disc. rev. allowed, 327 N.C.
486, 397 S.E.2d 228 (1990). For a full discussion of Hall, see supra note 11.
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